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IV 
ARGUMENT 
L THE TRIAL COURTS GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD 
NOT BE AFFORDED ANY DEFERENCE. 
A, THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT THE IMUSES MADE 
PERMANENT IMPROVEMENTS TO THE DISPUTED PARCEL 
SHOULD BE REVIEWED FOR CORRECTNESS. 
Whether permanent improvements were made to the disputed parcel is a question 
of law. A determination of whether a permanent improvement exists is not a fact 
intensive analysis and does not present a mixed question 0f fact and law. Even when 
there is a mixed question of fact and law, where there is a distinguishable issue that 
presents a question of law, the Court on appeal will review the determination of law for 
correctness and does not grant any deference to the trial court on that issue. See Anderson 
v. Thompson, 2008 UT App 3, ^ 13, 176 P.3d 464; see also State v. Rhinehart, 2006 UT 
App 517, H 8, 153 P.3d 830. The permanent improvement requirement is unique to 
Boundary by Estoppel claims and does not apply to equitable estoppel generally. See 
Youngblood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co,, 2007 UT 28, \ 14, 158 P.3d 1088 (setting forth the 
basic elements of equitable estoppel). Therefore, in reviewing the Boundary by Estoppel 
claim, the Court should review the trial court's finding of a permanent improvement for 
correctness. 
1 
B. THE GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON BOUNDARY BY 
ESTOPPEL SHOULD BE REVIEWED FOR CORRECTNESS, OR, 
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, WITH A SMALL DEGREE OF 
DEFERENCE. 
Even where an issue presents a mixed question of law and fact, "the measure of 
discretion afforded varies, however, according to the issue being reviewed/' State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994). Accordingly, with respect to certain issues 
presenting mixed questions of law and fact the Court will grant great deference to the trial 
Court but with regard to other issues the Court will not grant any deference to the lower 
court. See State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, ffi[ 23-24, 42, 144 P.3D 1096 (refusing to grant the 
trial Court any measure of deference on issue of custodial interrogation). In order to 
determine the appropriate level of deference, if any, the Court weighs the Pena factors, as 
revised by the Court in Levin. Id. at ^ 25 (eliminating the "novelty" factor). 
Notwithstanding the Court's holding in Irizarry,1 the Boundary by Estoppel question here 
presents additional policy concerns that warrant an analysis of the appropriate level of 
review under the Pena factors. In the present matter the Pena factors weigh against 
granting the trial court deference on the issue of Boundary by Estoppel. In the alternative, 
the Pena factors weigh against granting much discretion to the trial court. Each of the 
factors will be addressed in turn below. 
x
 State Dep 7 of Human Services ex rel Parker v. [marry, 945 P.2d 676, 678 (Utah 1997). 
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1. THE FACTS RELATING TO BOUNDARY BY ESTOPPEL 
ARE NOT SO COMPLEX AND VARYING THAT NO RULE 
MAY ADEQUATELY BE SPELLED OUT. 
Concerning the first Pena factor, the Court weighs the "degree of variety and 
complexity in the factors to the legal rule." Levin, 2006 UT at }^ 25. The question under 
this factor is not whether the facts will vary from case to case but whether the facts are 
"so complex and varying that no rule adequately addressing the relevance of all these 
facts can be spelled out" Id. at \ 39. Surely, Boundary by Estoppel is a fact dependant 
analysis and surely the facts relevant to such determinations will vary from case to case; 
however, the facts expected from these determinations atfe not so complex that no rule can 
be spelled out. 
The case of Levin is instructive on this third Pena factor. In Levin, the Court 
found that custodial interrogation was not so complex. WTiile equitable estoppel is a fact 
dependant analysis, custodial interrogation is even more so. In Levin, the court held that 
the fact sensitive determination of custodial interrogation did not warrant deferential 
appellate review under the first Pena factor because the facts related to the issue are 
relatively simple. Id. at ^[ 39, 42. In order to determine issues of custodial interrogation, 
the Levin court used four factors for determining custody from Salt Lake City v. Carner, 
664, P.2d 1168 (Utah 1983). The four Carner factors required the court to analyze a 
diverse set of facts including, but not limited to, the following: (I) location of the 
interrogation; (2) indicia of arrest, such as whether handcuffs were used, guns were 
-> 
J 
drawn, doors were locked, and threats or coercion were used, (3) whether the defendant 
was the focus of the investigation, and (4) whether the police officers should have known 
that their actions or words were likely to elicit an incriminating response Levin, 2006 UT 
at \ 39 Such determinations turn on whether the setting of the interrogation is custodial 
or accusatory rather than investigatory Carnet, 664 P 2d at 1170 Even though the 
question of whether a Defendant is in custody is highly fact-dependant, the Court 
concluded that the first Pena factor did not weigh in favor of appellate defeience because 
the facts are not too complex to carve out a general rule Levin, 2006 UT at |^ 39 The 
Court held that these factors piovided a well defined rule of law for which they could 
apply the relevant facts, thus resulting in a decision by the trial court that should be 
rev lewed for correctness 
A determination of Boundaiy bv Estoppel, although fact intensive, is also not so 
complex and varying that a general rule cannot adequately address the issue The 
elements of boundary by equitable estoppel are (I) a failure to act that is inconsistent 
with a claim later asserted, (2) leasonable action taken on the basis of a failure to act and 
(3) an injury would result from allowing repudiation of such a failure to act Dahl ln\ v 
Hughes, 2004 UT App 391, ^  14, 101 P 3d 83 Finally in addition to the above, the 
Court requires that permanent improvements be made on the disputed parcel Peterson \ 
Johnson, 34 P 2d 697, 698 (Utah 1934) (citing Ttipp \ Bagley, 276 P 912 (Utah 1928), 
and 69 A L R 1417) The relevant facts needed to determine the issue of a custodial 
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interrogation is much more fact sensitive than the relevant facts necessary for a 
determination of Boundary by Estoppel. In sum, although the facts relating to boundary 
by equitable estoppel will vary from case to case, this fiilst factor weighs against appellate 
deference because such facts are not "so complex and varying that no rule adequately 
addressing the relevance of all these facts can be spelled!out." Levin, 2006 UT at j^ 39 
(citing to State of Utah v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932; 232 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1994)). 
2. THE APPLICATION OF THE LEGAL RULE IN THIS 
MATTER WAS NOT BASED UPON FACTS OBSERVED BY 
THE TRIAL COURT. 
With respect to the second Pena factor, the Court looks to the degree to which a 
trial court's application of the legal rule relies on facts observed by the trial judge. Id. at ^ 
25. Where the trial court is in a position to observe facts that "cannot be adequately 
reflected in the record available to appellate courts," therp is a greater need for appellate 
deference. Id. at |^ 40. In the present matter, however, t te trial court is not in a superior 
position to make credability assessments or to observe other facts because the trial court 
relied upon the same affidavits and exhibits that are before the Court on appeal. 
Moreover, the facts presented here are such that they can be "adequately reflected in a 
cold record." Id. at |^ 40. Consequently, the second Pend factor does not weigh in favor 
of appellate deference and the Court should not grant any deference to the trial court, or, 
in the alternative, should grant only a small degree of deference on the issue of Boundary 
by Estoppel. 
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3. PUBLIC POLICY REQUIRES THAT THE COURT SET 
FORTH CONSISTENT STATEWIDE STANDARDS 
REGARDING THE TRANSFER OF PROPERTY UNDER THE 
DOCTRINE OF BOUNDARY BY ESTOPPEL. 
Regarding the third Pena factor, the Court considers "other policy reasons that 
weigh for or against granting discretion to the trial courts " Id at j^ 25 (internal 
quotations omitted) This third Pena factor is perhaps the most critical factor whereas 
"[e]ven where a case for appellate deference is strong under the first two factors, policy 
considerations may nevertheless lead [the Court] to limit that deference." Id. at \ 26. 
Accordingly, where the Court finds that, with respect to a particular mixed question, 
"society's interest in establishing consistent statewide standards outweighs other 
considerations, [the Court] grant[s] no discretion to the trial court, and [the Court] 
review[s] the mixed question for correctness " Id at 1J 23 
There are strong public policies relating to the ownership, possession, protection 
and transfer of real property See Utah Const Art I, § 1, Utah Code Ann § 25-5-3, Utah 
Code Ann § 57-3-101 et seq , Alvey Development Corp v Mackelprang, 2002 UT App 
220, 1^ 16, 51 P 3d 45 The Court has determined that "public policy favors certainty in 
title to real property to protect bonafide purchasers and to avoid conflicts of ownership " 
Alvey Development Corp , 2002 UT App at [^ 16 (citing Potter v Chadaz, 1999 UT App 
95, U 13, 977 P 2d 533) The policy of preventing injustice that supports equitable 
estoppel is duectly in conflict with other public policies relating to the ownership, 
possession, protection, and tiansfer of real property See Restatement (Third) of Property 
6 
(Servitudes) § 7.6 (2000). In light of the strong public pblicy related to real property and 
the conflict that arises between these policies and the policies supporting equitable 
estoppel, the Court should determine that the third Pena factor weighs heavily against 
granting the trial court deference. Consequently, the Co^irt on appeal should review the 
trial court's determination of Boundary by Estoppel for qorrectness so that the Court may 
establish consistent statewide standards concerning boundary disputes that may be applied 
uniformly by trial courts. 
Reviewing the Boundary by Estoppel defense as ^ matter of law comports with the 
manner in which the Court reviews determinations of boundary disputes made under 
different doctrines. For example, Boundary by Acquiescence determinations are 
reviewed as a matter of law, even though such determinations are highly fact sensitive. 
Willkinson Family Farm , LLC v. Babcock, 1999 UT Ap^ 366, \ 6 (although, given the 
"highly fact sensitive" nature of the determinations, the tifial court is afforded "some 
measure of discretion."). 
II. IT IS NOT APPROPRIATE TO AFFIRM ON THE BASIS OF BOUNDARY 
BY AGREEMENT WHEREAS THERE IS A GENUINE ISSUE OF 
MATERIAL FACT AND THE [MUSES ARE NOT ENTITLED TO 
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW 
The Imuses argue that the Court should affirm the trial court's decision on the 
alternate ground of Boundary by Agreement. In supportiijig their argument, the Imuses set 
forth a brief summary of the doctrine and refer the Court {o the Imuses1 supporting 
memoranda filed with the trial court at the time of Summary Judgment. Whereas the 
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Imuses have reiterated the arguments they made below, the following paragraphs shall set 
forth, essentially verbatim, the arguments made by the Bahrs below 2 
The Imuses do not meet the requirements under the doctrine of Boundary by 
Agreement There has been much confusion surrounding this theory as it relates to the 
doctrine of Boundary by Acquiescence see Staker v Ainsworth, 785 P 2d 417, 422 (Utah 
1990), see also Halladay v Cluff, 685 P 2d 500, 503 (Utah 1984), overruled on other 
grounds by Staker, 785 P 2d at 424 Despite this confusion, the Court has made it clear in 
recent years that the doctnnes are "separate doctrines, each springing from distinctive 
conceptual roots " See Carter v Hanrath, 885 P 2d 801, 805 n 5 (Utah App 1994), rev 'd 
on other grounds, 925 P 2d 960 (Utah 1996) The Boundary by Acquiescence doctrine is 
grounded in the law of property and is similar to principles of prescription Id 
Consequently, an express agreement between the parties is not necessary under a theory 
of Boundary by Acquiescence Id 
The doctrine of Boundary by Agreement, however, is based in contract law and on 
contract principles Id Therefore, the doctrine requires an agreement between the parties 
that is supported by consideration Id Specifically, the doctrine of Boundary by 
7The Bahrs have set forth in this brief the arguments they made below for the convenience 
of the Court, should the Court desire to rev lew such The Court may alternative!/ review, if it is 
so inclined, the full memoranda filed by the Bahrs Memorandum in Opposition lo Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment (R 648 800), Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support 
of Plaintiff s Partial Motion for Summary Judgment (R 490-579), Plaintiffs Reply to 
Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Partial Motion for Summary Judgment 
(R U59-U69) 
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Agreement requires: "(i) an agreement; (ii) between adjoining landowners; (iii) settling a 
boundary that was uncertain or in dispute; and (iv) executed by actual location of a 
boundary line. In addition, Utah requires mutual acquiescence for a long period of time." 
Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417, 423 n.4 (Utah 1990), In this case, the Imuses have not 
established the absence of a genuine issue of material fatt nor are they entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law under the doctrine of Boundary by Agreement. 
A. IMUSES ARE NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
WHEREAS THE BOUNDARY LINE WAS NOT IN DISPUTE OR 
UNCERTAIN. 
Imuses have failed to set forth evidence that the boundary line was uncertain or in 
dispute at the time that the fence was built. The boundaijy between adjoining properties 
must be uncertain or in dispute for a parole agreement filing the boundary between such 
properties to overcome Statute of Frauds concerns. Trip^ v. Bagley, 276 P. 912, 916 
(Utah 1928); see also Staker, 785 P.2d at 423. A boundary is uncertain or in dispute only 
where there is "some objectively measurable circumstance in the record title or in the 
reasonably available survey information . . . that would h^ve prevented a landowner, as a 
practical matter, from being reasonably certain about the true location of the boundary." 
Halladay, 685 P.2d at 505 (overruled on other grounds by Staker, 785 P.2d at 424). 
While Staker overruled Halladay, the holding in Staker is limited. Holladay 
addressed two issues: (i) whether uncertainty was an eleniient of Boundary by 
Acquiescence; and (ii) whether the uncertainty requirement would be evaluated under a 
9 
subjective or objective standard. Halladay, 685 P.2d at 501. The Halladay Court 
concluded that, although there had been a great deal of confusion concerning the 
uncertainty requirement, the weight of authority established that uncertainty was indeed 
an element of Boundary by Acquiescence, thus creating a fifth element for the doctrine.3 
Id. at 504. The Halladay Court then evaluated the meaning of the uncertainty 
requirement in light of both the doctrine of Boundary by Acquiescence and Boundary By 
Agreement. See id. at 504-505. The Court determined that the uncertainty requirement, 
under either doctrine, must be evaluated by an objective standard. See id. at 505. 
The issue before the Court in Staker was whether or not the fifth requirement of 
uncertainty should be eliminated from Boundary by Acquiescence claims. Staker, 785 
P.2d at 424. The Staker Court ruled that the uncertainty requirement effectively rendered 
the doctrine of Boundary by Acquiescence lifeless and, consequently, the Court 
eliminated the uncertainty requirement related to the doctrine of Boundary by 
Acquiescence. Id. at 423-424. The Court's holding in Staker, however, is limited to the 
doctrine of Boundary by Acquiescence and does not apply to the doctrine of Boundary by 
Agreement. See id. at 418; 422-423 CwWe affirm the judgment and overrule Halladay v. 
Cluff, 685 P.2d 500 (Utah 1984), and its progeny as to the "objective uncertainty1 
requirement in boundary by acquiescence") (emphasis added). The Court's holding in 
3
 The first four elements being: (i) occupation of the disputed property up to a visible 
monument; (ii) mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary; (in) for a period of twenty years; 
and (iv) by adjoining landowners. Carter v Hanrath, 925 P.2d 960, 961-962 (Utah 1996). 
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Staker, therefore, does not disturb the Halladay Court's holding that uncertainty, as it 
relates to the doctrine of Boundary by Agreement, is evaluated by an objective standard. 
In the present matter, there is no dispute that the titles to the adjoining properties 
provide an adequate description of the true boundary between the properties. See 
Peterson Engineering Survey; see also Bush & Gudgell, Inc. Survey; see also Plaintiffs' 
Warranty Deed, which is attached hereto as Exhibit "H"; see also Imuses' Warranty 
Deed, which is attached hereto as Exhibit "I". Both Bahrs and Imuses have procured 
surveys, which were based upon the descriptions on the titles to the properties. Both 
surveys show that the fence in question is located on the Bahrs' property. See Peterson 
Engineering Survey; see also Bush & Gudgell, Inc. Survey. Consequently, there is no 
dispute as to whether an objectively measurable defect iri the recorded title of the 
properties would have prevented the parties from being reasonably certain about the true 
location of the boundary. The Imuses and Bahrs' predecessors in interest simply failed to 
procure a survey, but such neglect does not rise to the level of "objective uncertainty." 
Therefore, Imuses have failed to establish a genuine dispute of material fact that the 
boundary was uncertain at the time of the alleged agreentent between Bahrs' predecessors 
in title. 
II 
B. THERE IS A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT AS TO 
WHETHER THE PARTIES AGREED TO THE BOUNDARY LINE 
FOR A PERIOD OF 20 YEARS. 
Although the Imuses argue at length as to why there should not be a time 
requirement imposed for Boundary by Agreement claims, the fact of the matter is Utah 
law requires mutual acquiescence for a long period of time. See Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 
P.2d 417, 423 n.4 (Utah 1990). More succinctly put is the following: 
It should be clearly understood that our case law does not support, and that 
we do not agree with the proposition that a landowner can claim boundary 
solely on the basis of an oral agreement. From a reading of the cases it will 
be seen that it requires the acceptance, or the giving of consent or approval, 
by words or conduct, over some substantial period of time and when certain 
requisites are met. This is tine because it must be appreciated that 
recognition of such boundaries does have the effect of transferring 
ownership of disputed strips of property without compliance with the statute 
of frauds; and it may be at variance with recorded conveyances. 
Hobson v. Panguitch Lake Corp., 530 P.2d 792, 794 (Utah 1975). No Utah court dealing 
with boundary by agreement, despite numerous arguments similar to Imuses' current 
argument, has ever held or indicated that mutual acquiescence for a long period of time is 
not required. In determining what amount of time constitutes a "long period of time" the 
courts have been consistent in holding that at least 20 years is needed, absent unusual 
circumstances. See id. ("[T]here must be some substantial long period of time . . . [that 
is] generally related to the common law prescriptive period of 20 years; and only under 
unusual circumstances would a lesser period be deemed sufficient.1'). 
Applying these requirements to the facts of this case, at the very minimum there 
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are factual disputes that remain Even construing the fadts in the light most favorable to 
Imuses, which is inappropriate for purposes of their motion, the existing fence was m 
place 20 years and a few months prior to their knowledge that Bahrs disagreed with the 
fence acting as the proper boundary line between their respective properties Bahrs, on 
the other hand have testified that they expressed doubt and concern to the Imuses about 
the boundary line throughout the years, which disagreement was made very clear in the 
spring and fall of 2002 due to an addition they made on their home and their builder's 
unequivocal conclusion that the fence was on Bahrs' property See Deposition of Sherri 
Bahr 18 3-19 23, 21 10-22 3,26 19-27 5,31 24-32 21,34 20-35 11,41 8-13,44 7-45 22, 
46 7-49 15,50 14-51 17,55 19-57 7,57 20-59 21,61 5-10, 129 24-130 4, Deposition of 
Robert Bahr 16 23-17 9, 20 6-21 5, 22 5-23 3, 34 20-35 16, 66 9-20, 70 2-71 2, and 
Deposition of lone Senn at 13 7-15 6, 18 19-19 I In short, at a minimum, construing all 
the facts and their reasonable inferences in Bahrs' favor, there is a factual dispute as to 
whether or not there was mutual acquiescence for a sufficiently long period of time in 
relation to the fence 
C. IMUSES ARE NOT ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT \ S 4 MATTER OF 
LAW WHERE THE SUPPOSED AGREEMENT W AS NO T 
SUPPORTED BY CONSIDERATION. 
The Imuses have failed to provide evidence that there was an agreement between 
Imuses and Bahrs' predecessors in title that was supported by consideration A parole 
agreement, pursuant to the doctrine of Boundary by Agreement, must be supported b> 
13 
consideration. See Carter, 885 P.2d at 805 n.5. Assuming arguendo that there was an 
agreement between Imuses and Bahrs' predecessors in interest, it is undisputed that no 
such agreement existed between Imuses and Bahrs with respect to the boundary at issue. 
See Deposition of Robert Bahr at 12-13; see also Deposition of Sherri Bahr at 15-44; see 
also Deposition of Robert Bahr at 15-17. Without consideration, no agreement can be 
formed and this too supports dismissing Imuses' Boundary by Agreement claim. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's grant of summary judgment was inappropriate because the Bahrs 
presented a genuine dispute of material fact and because the Imuses were not entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. The Bahrs presented evidence in record that they questioned 
the boundary line soon after acquiring an interest in their property. The Imuses assured 
the Bahrs that the fence was located on the true boundary line. Similarly, the Imuses did 
not present evidence concerning when the supposed improvements were made and 
whether these improvements were located on the disputed parcel. Construing this 
evidence in the light most favorable to the Bahrs, the Imuses would be precluded the 
defense of equitable estoppel whereas the Imuses could not have reasonably made 
improvements to the disputed property and they have not established detrimental 
damages. Accordingly, summary judgment was not appropriate given these outstanding 
factual issues. 
Moreover, the Imuses' estoppel claim fails as a matter of law. First, assuming 
14 
arguendo that the Bahrs did remain silent, the Bahrs did not engage in conduct that would 
give rise to estoppel. The Bahrs were not acting with full knowledge of the material facts 
or their rights. The Bahrs certainly did not misrepresent any material facts or act in an 
unconscionable manner. Second, the Imuses could not have relied on the Bahrs's conduct 
whereas the Bahrs questioned the boundary line. The Imuses similarly cannot argue that 
they relied on the Bahrs whereas the Imuses' fault contributed to their circumstances. 
The Imuses could likewise not rely on the Bahrs where the material facts were equally 
available to the parties. Third, the Imuses have failed to establish detrimental damages 
because they failed to present evidence that permanent improvements were made to the 
disputed parcel. Accordingly, the trial court's grant of summary judgment should be 
reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court. 
DATED this \ 4 day of November, 2008. 
KELLY & BRAMWELL, P.C. 
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